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THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES UNDER NIGERIA'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME*
BY
DR.M.O.OJO**
Abstract

Tbe paper seeks Jo apprui.s£ the f Ofei_gn exchange ma11agement strategies under the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) in Nigeria. As a background, it reviews the foreign exchange management strategies in the pre-SAP peliod which
largely relied 011 the use of trade a11d exchange controls. The
available evidence is that the use of the control tools contributed
to some extent co reducing bala11ce of payments deficits, but at
high costs in the fonn of increased malpractices and constraints
on the production proress. The associated over-valued n.aira
exchange rate discouraged production for export, encouraged
imports of fiindshed goods and raw materials and gave rise to
virile parallel foreign excha11ge markets. On the other hand,
foreign exclia11ge management under SAP has relied substa11tially on free market fore es in a generally deregulated economic
environment. The effects have been the significant elimination
of the over-valuation "f the naira exchange rate, boost to nonoil expons and the balance ofpayments. The main outsta11ding
problem has bee11 the persiste11t deprccia1io11 of the naira ex-change rate,as well us iis mstability. The zmder~yingfactor is the
weak export base in the midst of strong demand for foreign
exchange. The paper concludes that i.yith the uncertainty in the
outcome of the efforts to expand the export base coupled with
high debt burden, there would be. need to review national
development strategies such as would reduce the dependence of
the Nigerian economy on extemal trade in the long-run.
Introduction

Foreign exchange earnings from international trade transaction and external aid arc vital for the economic transforma tion of less-developed countries (LDCs). All other things
being equal, foreign exchange resources so earned can induce
increased factor supplies and promote the development of
technical skills and knowledge all of which should enhance
domestic capital formation and economic growth. Consequently, the role of foreign exchange has traditionally been a
critical element in the development planning process of
LDCs.

Between 1%0 and 1985, Nigeria went through varying
development experience which required prudent· management of available foreign exchange resources. Inadequate
foreign exchange was a major constraint in the execution of
the First National Development Plan, 1962 - 1%8, a situation
that was accentuated by the prosecution- of the civil war
between July 1967 and January 1970. Resource management
could be considered fairly adequate for the needs of the
period. The period 1970 -1980 witnessed a dramatic improvement in Nigeria's foreign exchange position following the
substantial increases in crude oil prices in 1973/74 and 1979.
However, foreign exchange management appeared too shortsighted in nature with the result that it took little cognisance
of possible long-term developments in the world economy.
Following the collapse of the world oil market in the early
1980s, Nigeria once more entered a very tight foreign exchange position especially in the context of previous commitments. Resource management initially was conceived in
terms of finding short-term solutions, but it became more
medium to long-term in approach since 1986 when it was
evident that the problems of the eocnomy were more fundamental than was previously conceived. Despite the fact that
foreign exchange management since 1986 has responded adequately to the· need.§ of the economy, it has raised several
issues which the design of future national development
strategics must take into account.
In the context of efforts to improve the efficiency offoreign
exchange management in Nigeria, the aim of this paper is to
review and assess the foreign exchange management
strategies under the on-going Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP). Part I of the paper provides a conceptual
framework for the subsequent analysis. Part II undertakes a
brief review and appraisal of foreign exchange management
between 1960 and 1985, while Part III examines the foreign
exchange management strategies since the inception of SAP
in 1986 up to the end of 1989. Part IV discusses the outstanding issues of foreign exchange management and their relevance
to Nigeria's long-term economic growth and development. A
summary and conclusion is also provided.

PART I: CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
-,

For a better understanding of this paper, it is useful to
define some relevant concepts and theoretical relationships
in foreign exchange management.

of current international transactions and for fmancing imbalances in a country's external payments position vis-a-vis
other countries. The main sources of foreign exchange to a

Basic Concepts

goods and services, inflow of foreign capital such as loans and
in~estments, as well as grants or gifts which represent
umlateral transfers. Defined in this way, foreign exchange is
a comi:onent of a country's official external reserves which may
be ddmed as the total stock of external assets which are
available to the monetary authorities of a country for the
settlement of international economic transactions. Besides
forc_ign exchange ( or convertible foreign currencies) def¥ied
carhcr, the other components of external reserves are the

'

country include foreign currency receipts from the exports of
The most basic concept is that of }<,reign exc:ha11gc which
m&y be defined as Lhe monetary asset used for the sclllement

••
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hol~ of monetary gold, the reserve position in the International Monetary Fund llMF) and the holdings of Special
Drawmg Rights (SDRs).For the purpose of this paper, there
is a focus on the official external reserves, particularly the
foreign exchange com~)llent..
•Denvmg from the definition ·of forllign. exchange given
above,Joreign excliange management can be defined as the art
of ensuring that the country's available foreign exchange
resources meet the needs of the economy- the is.sue of adequacy- and that foreign exchattge .resources are optimally
deployed. The level of dependence.of a country on international trade will to a large extent determine its degree. of
involvement in foreign exchange management. Apart from
ensuring that the value qf its foreign exchange resources is
secure, the country must ensure that the resources are at a
level adequate to meet its current trade commitments. Consequently, foreign exchange management embraces policy
.actions relating to foreign exchange receipts, disbursement
and building up of official reserves.
· . If a country must manage its foreign exchange resources
well, it should be done on the basis of acceptable criteria to
measure the-.ldequacy of the foreign exchange resources.
However, beeause·the role of foreign exchange varies from
country to country, there have not emerged generally acceptable measures of foreign exchange adequacy. In general, the
adequacy of foreign exchange resources will depend on,
among other factors, the motives for holding the resources as
well as the rate of their inflow and -disbursement. Two
measures of adequacy are now commonly used by countries.
At a rather theoretical level, adequacy can be related to some
macro-economic variables such as the money supply, national
income and trade balance. At a practical level, reserve adequacy is measured by specifying a given level of reserves that
is ~ufficient to meet the needs of an economy over a given
period of time. This is the basis of the reserves/import ratio
which emphasises the transactions motive for holding reserves
by specifying the minimum reserves requirement' of a country
that would meet her import demand over some given period
f time. Conventionally, a reserve.level sufficient to finance a
minimum of four months' import bills at the current monthly
rate of importation is considered adequate. Nigeria has used
this indicator since 1962.

[l~

Policy Instruments of Foreign Exchange Management
Less-developed countries have applied many policy instruments for effective management of their foreign exchange
resources. These instruments can be roughly divided into
three groups - those that focus on controlling the demand and
supply of foreign exchange, as well as those aimed at curbing
demand.while assisting in building up the supply base.
The first group of instruments which attempt to limit
demand within the available supply include:
(i)
trade and exchange controi
(ii) administrative controi and
(iii) foreign exchange budgeting.
Basically, a trade and exchange control regime is one which
tries to eliminate a potential balance of payments deficit
through the rationing of the available foreign exchange. This

process could allow for improvement in the balance of payments, build-up of external rese_ryes J?_osition and. an o.E!_imal ,
development of foreign exchange resources. To acnieve tnese
objectives, a trade and exchange control regime usually has
such features as stringent restrictions on trade flows esqecially
during periods of severe pressures on foreign exfhange
resources, as well as numerous regulations on- the 1use of
foreign exchange. For instance, importers and other tlsers of
foreign exchange may be required to obtain approval for the
purchase of foreign exchange from a central pooi while exporters maybe required to surrender their export earnings to
the same pool. In general, such a regime requires that all
foreign exchange transactions must be channelled through
authorised agents. The use of administrative controls and
budgeting tends to supplement the goal of trade and exchange
control. Administrative devices are generally used to make
exchange control measures more effective through, for instance, greater scrutiny of foreign exchange appli<Fttions,
lengthening the process between granting approvals ~d actual remittance and monitoring of tpe utilisation of approvals
with respect to their contents and values. On the other hand,
foreign exchange budgeting provides an overall control
whereby foreign exchange receipts and payments are matched
at the beginning of a period and these form the basis of
periodical evaluation of the control apparatus.
The second group of policy instruments used mainly in
enhancing the supply of foreign exchange resources includes,
among others, export promotion and portfoli9 diversification.
Export promotion involves the use of incentives to boost the
volumes and values of exports as a way of earning enough
foreign exchange to acquire imports, ensure balance of payments viability and promote export. diversification. On the
other hand, portfolio diversification which refers to thefavestment composition of available foreign exchange resoUrces is
aimed at preserving the capital value of the external· assets.
The investment policy is normally dir~cted towards holding
liquid, profitable and low-risk assets·~ order to ensure maximum return on investment while ininimising exchange risk
which could be high if assets are cpncentrated in one currency
which may be subject to depreciation or even devaluati9~.
The third group of policy instruments consists of macroeconomic policy tools which .coul~ enhance the supply of
foreign exchange while curbing the excessive use of it.
Monetary and fiscal policies, while trying to reduce inflationary pressures and maintain budgetary disciplliie, create the
necessary environment for effective foreign exchange
management. Exchange rate policywhicfi is also an important
element of macroeconomic policy is cri\'ical for foreign ex:.
change management. ·Since the exchange rate is-the price of
one currency in t~rms of another, it is determined by the
interplay of supply and demand under a free market environment. An appropriate exchange rate will tend to maintain
equilibrium in the outflow and inflow of foreign exchange in
the economy. An inappropriate exchange rate policy in the
form, for instance, of under and overvaluation of the currency
will tend to create instability in the foreign exchange market
and make foreign exchange management more difficult.
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PART II FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT IN THE PRE-SAP PERIOD
Instruments of Foreign Exchange Management

A brief overview of foreign exchange management
strategies in the pre-SAP period is necessary in order to place
the current management strategies in their proper perspective. Focusing on the 1962 - 1985 period, the paper discusses
the main features of the period, the objectives of foreign
exchange management, and the instruments used, before attemplii-.g an overall appraisal ~he strategies.applied.

During the period under review, several instruments were
designed to manage the country's available foreign exchange
resources, but greater reliance was put generally on the use of
controls. The most important legal backing for this was the
Exchange Control Act of 1962 which vested the Minister of
Finance with the authority to grant approvals in respect of
foreign exchange transactioru.. But most of The functions
relating to private seccor transactions were delegated to the
CBN which in turn delegated approving authority for most of
the transactions to the authorised dealers. The Federal Ministry of Finance dealt with applications from the public sector
and some major private sector transactions: The exchange
control practice was well-known for the numerous regulations
on the use of foreign exchange usually under a foreign exchange budget. For instance, importers and other users of
foreign exchange were required to obtain approval to purchase foreign exchange from the authorities, while exporters
were required to surrender their export proceeds to the same
authorities. The most important requirement was that all
foreign exchange transactions were required to be channelled
through the authorised dealers failing which stiff penalties
were applied. Various administrative controls in addition to
quantitative import restrictions were designed to back up the
regulations. Some of these included the import licensing
requirement, the requirement of Form 'M' and the institution
of the Comprehensive Import Supervision Scheme {CISS).
Generally, the control measures, were made stringent when
balance of payments deficits were severe .and r e ~ during
periods of strong balance of payments position. Stringent
exchange control was prominent during 1982 - 1985 when
there were severe pressures on the balance of payments.
Exchange control regulations were relaxed during 19'n- 1976
and 1980 - 1981 when the balance of payments position either
m<\Ved froll\ deficit to surplus or the surplus increased.
Following the dramatic increase in foreign exchange earnings in 1973, asset diversification became very relevant as an
instrument of foreign exchange management the primary aim
being to preserve the capital value of the assets. Also, the
prevailing instability in the international monetary system
compelled the Bank to distribute its foreign exchange assets
in order to reduce the risk of capital loss. To achieve the aim
of asset diversification, an Investµient Management Committee was established in December 1974 charged with the
responsibility of investing in securities of varying degrees of
maturity denominated in major international currencies. The
objectives of asset diversification were generally achieVdd by
this strategy and as at the end of 1976, the CBN's extenaal
assets were held in nine convertible currencies compared with
only four at the end of 1974.
• To some extent, fiscal and monetary policies were also
designed during this period to influence judicious use and
promote increased earnings of foreign exchange. To recount
all these here is really unnecessary. But the ,r,of exchange
rate policy which is a key element in the 1ei"oeconomic
framework needs some focus. During the pertod, the naira
was not traded on the exchange markets and its exchange rate
was administered or managed. Thus, with the advent of floating exchange rates in the world economy, the value of the naira
was fixed in terms of the US dollar and in terms of the British
Pound Sterling independently, on the basis of the relative
strengths of the two convertible currencies. From February

Background And Objectives
Wtth respect to the features of the period, two aspects can
be examined - the institutional set up for foreign exchange
management and the varying economic environme,nts which
were influenced to a large extent by the prevailing foreign
exchange position. The major institutional development
during the period was the authority given to the Central Bank
of Nigeria in 1962 to be the main custodian of the country's
foreign exchange reserves which previously had been held
jointly with the Federal and Regional Governments including
their parastatals. From that year,.the CBN held the bulk of
the country's external assets leaving only working balances
with the other holders. The Bank subsequently took steps to
diversify the foreign reserves away from sterling assets and
into other assets. Thus effective management of foreign exchange reserves could be embarked upon by the monetary
authority. However, foreign exchange management was affected by, among other factors, the nation's economic and
foreign exchange position. The period 1962 - 1985, as noted
earlier, for the most part was characterised by inadequate
foreign exchange resources a situation that was more relatively difficult to manage. The sub-periods of acute foreign exchange scarcity were 1962 - 73, 1977 - 79, and 1981 - 85.
However, between 1974 and 1976 and in 1980, foreign exchange resources expanded substantially due to the
favourable price development in the international oil market,
with ctude oil being the main source of foreign exchange
earnings. In these periods, foreign exchange disbursement
was rather -liberal, thus increasing the pressures in periods of
scarcity.
Foreign exchange management during the period had
three, but not mutually exclusive objectives. These were to
conserve the available resources, ensure the adequacy of
reserves and preserve their value. The first objective of conservation could be realised with the concentration of foreign
exchange holdings at the Central Bank-and what was required
was to ensure that the rate of foreign ex'change expenditure
was controlled to check undue depiction of reserves. The
second objective of reserve adequacy was important to ensure
that the foreign exchange reserves were maintained at levels
consistent with current and future international commitments. The third objective arose from the second and it
sought to preserve the purchasing power of the reserves
through their optimal deployment into strong currencies,
making it relatively easy to switch assets as the need arose and
ensuring that thery were easily realisable to meet payments
obligations. In terms of the sub-periods discussed earlier, it
can be said that ensuring Lhe adequacy of reserves was a
paramount objective in all of them, but certainly was more
important in the periods of foreign exchange scarcity. In
periods of scarcity also, ,Lhe conservation objective was of
priority, while asset preservation app~ared more urgent
during periods of comfortable foreign exchange resources.
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1978lto the adoption of SAP, the naira exc&ange rate was
ba.sc4 on import-weighted basket of currencies supplemented
by such factors like reserve levei cross-rate considerations,
relaqve rates of inflation and discretional judgement of the
per~ived relative strengths of various currehcies of majot
trading partners. The actual determination bf the naira ex0
change rate appeared to have been largely influenced by the
levels of foreign exchanged inflow and reserves. Generally,
the naira exchange rate was appreciated when the level-of
rese-.ves was increased, but a corresponding policy ,of
depr~on Wil5 not promptly applied when the reserve level
declined. The monetary authorities retained a large measure
of discretion in setting the naira exchange rate in spite of the
laid down aiterion of import-weighted basket of currencies.
All these actions coupled with the expansionary fiscal policy
of the government resulted in an overvalued exchange rate of
the naira throughout the period.
i

evasions, bottlenecks in the production process and corruption all of which tended to dent the image of the country. It
was however observed that these D!alpractices prevailed eyen
when exchqe control regulations were ·some,w~ren!
suggesting t&t only ~tal 4.w
Uo:iination of the co
Js co . d
have stopped the malpractices and attendant cial
economic costs.
·
'
'
·
Nigeria's exchange rate policy which encouraged overvaluation of the exchange rate during the period was
r.ounterproductive to effective foreign exchange management.
Firstly, n undermined the incentives to produce for eX:pOrt
because of the resultant uncompetitive prices in local currency. This was one basic reason for the collapse of Nigeria's
traditional exports. Secondly, the overvaluation made imports cheaper which explained the high rate of importation of
consumer goods into Nigeria. This factor created •excessive
demand for .limited foreign exchange resources ;and C()lltributed in no small way to the growth of fraudule~ activilks
in the import trade. Thirdly, the naira overvaluati~ helJjed
to sustain-the manufacturing sector's overdependence on
ported inputs which were made cheaper. In addition to this,
such industries were protected by high tariffs on competing
imports of final goods. Fourthly, the overvalued~ exchange rate encouraged the growth of parallel foreign exchange markets and capital flight. Owing to the scarcity of
and rationing of available foreign exchange, ·the so-called
"black" markets (parallel markets) emerged in many obscure
and SOIJ1.etimes open places where foreign exchange dealiags
took place surreptitiously. The parallel markets ;generally
tried to meet the unsatisfied demand from the official sources.
With the inappropriate exchange rate, private suppliers
preferred to sell their foreign exchange holdings in the parallel
markets. Invariably, official foreign P-xcbange found iu way
into such markets. These leakages were detrime~lo the
foreign exchange management process. On the othel'. hand,
the naira overvaluationgenerated a lot of speculati~ regatding possible changes in policy. With such overvaluation, it was
thought that devaluation would be applied which ~uraged
the transfer of funds to prevent the anticipated capital loss.

I

Appraisal of Foreign Exchange Management Strategies

un-

The foreign exchange management strategies in the preSAP period ~d two impo!tant elt:ments which have been
discussed ealier. The first was the exchange control regime
used to stem foreign exchange outflow and improve the
balance of payments position. There is need for evidence to
iadicate whether these objectives were achieved. The second
was the exchange rate of the naira which gradually became
overv~ued. It is also necessary to examine the effect of this
on foreign exchange management and the economy itself.
On the role of tho exd1ange control regime, the important
work by Anifowose (1983) was quite revealing. There were
two important conclusions from his study. rustJy, it was found
that during the period 1967 - 1981, strict applications of
excbange control did contribute to correcting balance of payments deficits and stemming foreign exchange outflow. But
in some periods when substantial balance of payments
surpluses were generated, other factors, especially favourable
oil prices, rather than exchange control were predominant.
Secondfy. although exchange control could be useful in checking foreign exchange outflow. it had its social costs in the
Nigerian environment. These included malpractices and

PART III FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENTUNDER SAP
exchange. Under the Decree, there was among-Others, a
By the end of 1985 there was coruiiderable disenchantment currency retention scheme under which exporters of non-oil
both in the government and private sector with the use of wide commodities were permitted to retain 25 per cent (later inranging controls as a tool of economic management, par- creased to 100 per cent under SAP) of their export proceeds
ticularlywhen the renewed wave of controls between 1982 and as an incentive to produce more for export. The second was
1985 failed to stem· the deterriorating external payments the initiation of the Domi~ Account scheme which perproblems of the period. This was evident in the formulation mitted individuals and corporal~ bodies resident in Nigeria to
of the 1986 ·Budget and economic policy proposals, which operate foreign currency accounts with banks in N"igeria. The
amounted to a clear departure from previous policy strategies. main objectives of the measures were to check the OQttlow 9f
While it was accepted that the control measures did to some foreign exchange by residents· and reduce the demand pr~extent assist in reducing excessive foreign exchange expendi- sure on official foreiipi eQange re~ources._ Lastly, ~ture, their cost to the economy was considered enormous. audget hoped to lt,blish the. Second-Tier Foreigri Etchan.ge
Consequently, the 1986 Budget sought to de- emphasise ~n- Market (SFEM) t~r in the ye¥ as a me~ of a ~ '
a
trols and adopted policy measures aimed "t expandingt the more raqonal det qninatio;n of µte naira tr.xchange
ipid
'
economy's resource base. To attain this goal, the ~986 Budget , consequently a IµQr<r efficient ~ocation of foreign
, , ,
,
'
,
contained three-important policy measures. The first set of I resources.
measures was contained in,the Export (Incentives and Miscel- I
Economic ~eregulation in <:9ntrast to C<X>DOmic COQtrol
laneous Provisions) Decree of 1986 whose main aim was the was the philosophy behind SAP which attempted to ~uild on
enhancement of the country's level of foreign exchange earn- the 1986 Budget. Adopted in July 1986, SAP's main element
ings from non-oil sources which would also greatly reduce the was the adoption of appropriate pricing policies in all sectors
dependence on the oil sector as the major source of foreign of the economy with greater reliance on inarket forces and
1
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reduction in -complex administrative controls with a view to
rationalising the use of scarce resources, promoting economic
diversification and stimulating domestic production.
Objectives of Foreign Excbange Management

-. Basically, under SAP, foreign exchange management
hinged on providing a mechanism for achieving a realistic
exchange rate of the naira. Since the naira exchange rate was
grossly overvalued, such a mechanism would be expected to
result in a depreciated naira exchange rate which would in
tum lead to the attainment of several desirable objectives. On
the demand side, such a realistic rate should reduce excessive
demand for foreign exchange, particualrly for the importation
of finished goods and services. On the supply side, the realistic rate should eliminate the prevailing distortions in the
economy and stimulate non-oil exports in particular as well as
attract inflow of foreign capital and funds held abroad by
Nigerians. Effective rationalisation of the demand and supply
of foreign exchange would ultimately produce a salutary effect
on the country's balance of payments position. If the objective
of eliminating bureaucratic and-rigid exchange controls could
be: attained, it was also feasible for the new foreign exchange
system to eliminate illegal cum:ncy trafficking, smuggling
activities and other foreign exchange malpractices. Ultimately, these developments should resuh in a large degree of
convertibility of the naira under whkh the benefits of trade
expansion, larger investment inflow, efficient resource allocation and the absence of currency malpractices can be sustained.
The SFEM was the main institution at the inception of SAP
for the achievement of thi..: foreign exchange management
policy objectives. The first-tier market also operated
alongside the SFEM operations and was designed to accommodate payments for public sector debt service pa~ents and
obligations to international organisations and embassies.
However, in July 1987, the market dett:rmination of the naira
exchange rate was reinforced· when a single FEM emerged
from the merger of the first-tier and SFEM exchange rates.
The FEM-covered not only dealings in official funds, but also
autonomous funds which encouraged exporters because of a
much depreciated rate to repatriate their proceeds. The
operations of the autonomous segment of FEM later became
destabilising arising from th\! tendency towards high arbitrage
premium and !>Uspicion that official fund was finding its way
into the segment and had to· be merged with_ the official
segment early in 1989.
There were other institulional adjustments to support the
effectiveness of the manllgement system. The Commodity
Boards which had hitherto the sole responsibility of marketing
non-oil exports were dissolved in December 1986, thereby
enabling individual producers to handle the marketing of their
products. Also, with the abolition of import and export licensing, the Federal Ministry of Trade ceased to be patt of the
foreign exchange managt:mcnt process. Late in 1989, the
bureau de change was introduced into the foreign exchange

market to handle small scale foreign exchange transactions
based on non-official funds whicli could further reduce
demand pressure on official foreign exchange resources and
also reduce illegal foreign exchange practices.

Policy Instruments For Foreign Exchange Management
A number of policy instruments were adopted at the inception of SAP and in the process of programme implementation
to attain the objectives outlined above. One of the incentives

for boosting export receipts and diversifying the export.base
was the abolition of the commodity boards and the export
licensing requirements which was done to encourage more
people to export. However, companies which fail to
repatriate export proceeds as required are penaliz.ed through
curtailment of their use of other foreign exchange facilities.
Another incentive was the permit given to exporters to retain
100 per cent of their export proceeds in their domiciliary
accounts as a way of checking over- invoicing of and incidence
of capital flight and smuggling activities. Some institutional
facilities were introduced to support the export drive. One of
these was the implementation of the new shipping policy
under the aegis of the newly established National Martime
Authority based on a 40-40-20 formula allowing Nigerian
vessels to lift 40 per cent of the value of trade while trading
partners' and third party vessels could lift 40 and 20 per cent
respectively. This measure has a great potential for enhancing
Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings from the maritime trade.
Other export facilities include those introduced by the CBN
such as the Rediscount and Refinancing Facility (RRF) and
the establishment of the Nigerian Export Credit Guarantee
and Insurance Corporation (NEXIM). The CBN facility was
introduced to induce authorised dealers to go into export
financing. Loans given to exporters by the dealers can be
refinanced by the CBN at its minimum rediscount rate, which
would provide a good margin to the dealers who lend at
commercial rates. The NEXIM was established to give further incentives to exporters through credit, loan guarantee
and insurance.
To keep foreign expenditure within reasonable limits, some
instruments were designed and backed up by appropriate
measures. The instruments include the operation of strict
foreign exchange budget control, pegging of debt service
payments and evolving a viable exchange rate of the naira. Of
course, monetary and fiscal policies have been used to support
these measures from time to time.
Appraisal of Foreign Exchange Management Strategies

In evaluating the effectiveness of the foreign exchange
management strategies adopted since 1986, we intend to identify the achievements of the new system, as well as the outstanding problems. The achie'7ements of the new foreign
exchange management strategies should be based on objective criteria, derived -from the underlying objectives of the
programme. In this connection, five aspects may be examined; deriving a viable exchange rate for the naira, expand~
ing and diversifying non-oil exports, reducing non-essential
importation, strengthening the balance of payments position
and eliminating illegal foreign exchange practices. Available
data on these aspects are presented in Tables 1- 7.
That the naira exchange rate has to a large extent shed its
overvaluation since SAP is hardly controvertible. The bone
of contention has been whether it has at each point in time
attained a reasonable degree of viability or whether the rate
so established has engendered economic ~tability. While
many believe that the rate has movedre~~to its equilibrium level, others have argued that the naira bas become
undervalued. Since a free exchange rate system should be
driven by the everchanging nati~nal and international
economic environment, it will only be valid to argue for a
particular exchange rate level after identifying all the relev~
determinants:- In this vein, it appears that instability of the rate
rather than undervaluation has been the main problem of the
naira exchange rate since SAP and this is discussed under the

JS

outstanding problems later. Generally Lhe more appropriate
Naira exchange rate established since 1986 has produced
some favourable effects on various micro and macro variables.
For instance, the value of non-oil exports averaged N2.7 billion between 1987 and 1989, which was nearly six times the
average between 1984 and 1986. The upward trend observed
since 1986 was sustained up to 1989. While the value of
imports has increased substantially due to the depreciated
naira exchange rate, the growth in dollar terms has been much
less than during the pre-SAP period. On the other hand, the
structure of imports has shifted slightly towards capital goods
and raw materials and away from consumer goods. The
proportion of the latter out of total imports has declined from
about 30 per cent during the three years preceding SAP to 25
per cent between 1987 and 1989. Under FEM, the bulk of
foreign exchange has been allocated to the directly productive
sectors such as industry and agriculture.
Overall balance of payments position has gradually improved since SAP with a consequent pm.itive effect on foreign
exchange reserves. Of special significance was the large increase in official reserves from N3.3 billion in 1988 to N13.8
billion in 1989. At that level, the reserves could cover 3.8
months of foreign exchange commitments at the prevailing
average rate of disbursement, compared with 1.3 months at
the end of 1988. On the objective of reducing foreign exchange malpractices, it can be claimed that the new foreign
exchange malpractices, it can be claimed that the new foreign
exchange system hs reduced the level of such malpractices.
The activities of the parallel market have continued since the
official market could not meet all the demand for foreign
exchange. Further liberalisation of the system through the
creation of the bureau de change referred to earlier has
however reduced the overall importance of the parallel
market in foreign exchange transactions.
While the foreign exchange management strategies since
1986 have brought some economic benefits, some problems
have emerged and in most cases reflect symptoms of the
economy's fundamental problems. Although, it is clear that
the naira exchange rate has moved towards a more appropriate level since SAP, the instability of the market rates
has been of concern to the authorities. For instance, the naira
exchange rate deprecaited by 20 per cent at the end of 1987
compared with the level at the end of 1986. By December
1988, the rate depreciated further by 22.7 per cent, while it
depreciated by another 30 per cent at the end of 1989. The
major effects have been increased cost-push inflation,
speculation and its unconduciveness to planning. Frequent
institutional adjustments have added to the mstability since
the authorities all along wanted to achieve the objective of
enhanced private foreign exchange earnings in view of the
instability of the official component. Another major cause of
instability has been the inadequate funding of the market.
Demand has continued to exceed supply of foreign exchange
because virtually every unit of the higher total liquidity of the
system is a potential buyer of the grossly diminished foreign
exchange earnings. For instance, while the weekly supply of
foreign exchange rose from US $42.5 million in 1987 to
US$55.0 million in 1988, it declined to US$46.1 million in 1989.
On the other hand, the weekly demand for foreign exchange
rose from US$53.6 million m 1987 to US$62. 7 million in 1987
and US $333.4 million in 1989. As a result, the supply gap
declined from $11.1 million per week in 1987 to US $7.7
million in 1988, but increased sharply to $287 .3 million in

1989. These trends not only resulted in large fluctuations in
the naira, exchange rate, but in its persistent depreciation
against the US dollar.
Domestic inflation rates have risen faster than those of our
trading partners and certainly the inflation rates of 1988 and
1989 were rather excessive. This has been another source of
exchange rate instability. It should however be remembered
tpat there have been other causes of high inflation besides the
cost- push effect of the depreciated naira exchange rate.
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies which have fuelled
demand pressures in the midst of perennial supply bottlenecks have been important in the high dometic inflation. It
is instructive to note that steps taken by the government to
increase funding of the FEM through obtaining balance of
payments support loans and mopping up excess liquidity from
the economy since the second quarter of 1989 have helped to
stabilise the naira exchange rate since then. In fact. mucb of
the depreciation of the naira exchange rate occurred in the
first two months of the year which recorded a depreciation
rate of 29.4 per cent. During the one year period ending
February 1990, the naira exchange rate depreciated by only
3.9 per cent. Also the parallel market premium has been
reduced substantially. It increased from 9.4 per cent at the
end of 1987 to 56.1 per cent at the end of 1988, but narrowed
to 24.0 per cent in December 1989.
The fundamental factors of the unstable naira exchange
rate and the weakness of the naira generally must be realistically traced to their sources and this leads us to examine the
serious problems associated, with the fragile export base and
the built-in high import dependence of the economy. Export
receipts have continued to be as unstable as they were in the
early 1980s though the trend is currently favourable due to the
better situation of the international oil market. At the same
time, the prices of non-oil exports, particularly the traditional
ones, have been depressed while ~he protectionist tendencies
in the industrial countries have been inhibitive to the growth
of manufactured exports. The result has been that oil still
accounts for about 95 per cent of total export earnings at
present. To all intents and purpose&, the diversification objective is still far from being achieved. The implication is-that
the·econollly is still prone to shocks in the present situatioo Qf
its export structure. Coupled with the.fragile export structure,
foreign exchange leakages through non- repatriation of export
pi:~ds and smuggling activities have persisted. It is clear
that no matter how liberal the system is some economic agents
try to engage in malpractices which tend to undermine the
institution of many in~ntives. With respect to the persistent
high demand for foreign ex:cbange, there are two outstanding
issues. F'mt is the economy"s heavy dependence on imported
raw materials, machinery and spare parts. Even if the importation of consumer goods could be reduced significantly ui the
short run, it is unlikely that such a result can be achieved in
the case of capital goods and raw materials· on which the
domestic production process is heavily dependent. The
second is the high debt service payment which is also in-built
into the system since it is a result of past actions. Even if the
economy can limit itself to the 30 per cent debt service ratio
being currently applied, it is definitely too high relative to the
country's foreign exchange supply and it is a far cry from the
debt service ratio of about one per cent before 1980.
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PART IV THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT
'the main feature of foreign exchange management under from the developing countries through the imposition of tariff
SAP has been the movement away from the use of controls as and DOD-tariff barriers sue.has the imposition of quot:~:un ..
an insttument into the u~e of free market principles and cary export restraints, licensing, embargoes and · · wri
private initiative in a deregulated environment. This feature price regulations. These have been done to prote4t Iocai
is vividly illustrated in the current trade and exchange regime. industries and provide short-run support for the baliµice oi
However reliance on free marw forces a11d private initiative payments. Incidentally, the developing countries adopt
has not been pursued as a self-justifying strategy, as official similar restrictive trade actions for the same reasons, suggestintervention has been adopted to avoid serious policy con- ing that contrary to expectations, the world economy is not
flicts. For instance, there has been offidal intervention in the opening up as fast as it should. In a world of powerful,
exchange rate determination on several occasion while trans- economic blocs, the developing countries are unfavourably
actions in the FEM are still partially based on a system of placed in terms of increased trade flows. Thirdly, ~reisthe
allocation rather than on full application of inte,tplay of supply issue of Nigeria's serious debt burden. Byall·conventional
and demand forces. Also, many trade restrictions have been external debt indicators, her debt burden is heavy. For inretained or newly imposed in the interest of the economy as a stance, the debt service ratio moved from an average of only
0.7 per cent between 1971 and 1977 to 8.8 per cent in 1982 and
whole.
From the analysis in Parts II and lII, an important factor in has remained under 30 per cent since 1986 because; of the
effective foreign exchange management is an adequate supply official policy not to allow it to exceed that level. As aimattet
of foreign exchange which can only be derived from a diver- of fact, if it were possible to effect all the debt service paymeuh
. sified export base and stability of the foreign exchange inflow. due, the debt service ratio would not be less than 40 per cent
Another critical factor is the ability to disburse the foreign a year. AS the economy utilises more than the requisite
exchange inflow in favour of the productive sectors that are proportion of its export receipts to service debt, there is less
expected to guarantee future foreign exchange supply. On the for supporting investment in the economy. The increased
basis of these factors, foreign exchange management even debt burden has been transmitted into a balance of payments
under the free market enviruument has faced major difficul- problem partially stemmed by a relatively lower volume of
ties mentioned earlier. These include the persistently narrow importation of capital goods and raw materials which may be
export base which has largely depended on the crude oil linked indirectly to slow growth in domestic output particularsub-sector, the instability in export receipts due largely to low ly in the agricultural and industrial sectors. These are the
commodity prices and the large portion of foreign exchange sectors that should strengthen the export promotion drive.
earnings devoted to debt service payments.
However, it is not being suggested that the current
The seriousness of some of these problems is only begin- strategies, particularly those that bear on foreign exchange
ning to be properly understood in the country. We can il- management are wrong. What is being suggested is that just
lustrate with three of them - the commodity problem, as, with a knowledge of hindsight, a trade and production
increasing international protectionism and the external debt strategy based on import substituting industrialisation was not
burden. Firstly, there is the problem of the long-term decline the most effective one, undue emphasis on an export-oriented:
in the demand for primary commodities on which the develop- growth has its limitations outlined earlier which must be coning countries largely depend for their export earnings. Even st ant ly reviewed in the context of overall development'
if Nigeria were to regain her lost position in the exports of strategies. Over time, it should be possible to develop an
primary products like cocoa, palm produce, grains and external trade policy strategy within the development plancereals, the prospects of poor for substantial growth in export ning process which should normally focus on rapid agriculreceipts because of the excess supplies of these commodities tural and industrial transformation in the economy. In other
in the world markets at present. This was the basis of the words, the role of external trade in an economy should be
recent ban on the ~orts of primary commodities like cocoa designed from its internal strength. A country like Nigeria
beans, palm kernels and natural rubber. Apart from excess with a potentially strong economic base should not be over
supplies which have depressed prices to their lowest levels in dependent on external trade. The economy is capable of
60 years, exporters of primary products have to contend with being developed into a strong one where the eventual convertthe unstable growth in the industrial countries which deter- ibility of the naiia could ensure optimum allocation of resourmine the demand for these products, and the reduction in the ces and short-run crisis management of foreign exchange
intensity of raw materials utilization in production processes resources would be unnecessary. The hard knot of this uldue to improved technologies. It should also be remembered timate goal of development is that more foreign exchange is
that most developing countries are now implementing struc- needed for supporting the economic base. The effective imtural adjustment programmes which all emphasise export plementation of Nigeria's Perspective and Rolling Plans is the
promotion. If they all succeed, the commodity problem will fastest way to get away from this dilemma.
.
be compounded. Secondly, the increasing level of protectionism by the industrialised countries has the potential to Summary and Conclusion
dampen outward looking trade strategies and also has the
This paper has assessed the foreign exchange management
implication that diversification into processed or manufacstrategies
under the Structural Adjustment Programme in·
tured exports is equally difficult to sustain in the present
international environment. It is a fact that some developing Nigeria. It defined foreign exchange management as embraccountries is South East Asia and Latin America have achieved ing policy actions relating to foreign exchange receipts, disa major break through in their export promotion strategies. bursement and building up of official reserves. The main
But the developing countries as a group appear to be having instrument of foreign exchange management on the demand
problems penetrating the markets of major industrialised side is trade and exchange control which attempts to eliminate
countries. Very often, this has implied the control of imports potential balance of payments deficits through the rationing
1
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of avail~ble foreign exchange. Export promotion ~nd portfolio
diversification are the main tools on the suppl~ side, while
various macroeconomic policy instruments could be used to
intluenpe both the supply and demand for ori· exchange.
Under~ free market environment, exchange ra policy is an
import4m,t instrument in foreign exchange qian ement.
By. and large, foreign-cxchange,nanagemen in pre-SAP
Nigeria relied on the use of trade and exchange controls. The
exchange rate of the naira was- administered and because it
tended! to be overvalued, it inhibited effective foreign exchangejmanagement. The empirical evidence ~ that the use
of these tools generally contributed to correcting balance of
payments deficits but it had its costs in malpractices and
evasions, as well as being a source of bottlenecks in the
production process. The exchange rate regime discouraged
production for export, encouraged imports especially of consumerg·oods and raw materials, and inducedte growth of
paralle foreign exchange markets with all its a erse effects.
For ign exchange management under SAP as designed
within e overall philosophy of economic deregulation and
the dominance of free market forces. A mechanism for
achieving a realistic exchange rate of the naira was designed
to curb excessive demand for foreign exchange, while in addition to other incentives it was expected to boost export earn ings. Since SAP came into force, the over-valuation of the
naira exchange rate has largely been removed and this has to
some extent boosted non-oil exports and check~d the inflow
£.
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of non-essential imports. The balance of payments position
has improved while there has been satisfactory build up of
external reserves. However, some problems ha\'e been:experienced and these include the instability in the • • lex.,. ,
change ~*e wbicJi at various times encouraged s # . ·
and teinfor~ ·
tionary tendencies. While the
e
rate of the
!aioed stable since the second q
· of j
1989, the basic problems of the situation generally persist and 1
these include the fragile export base and foreign exchange
leakages in the midst of strong demand for foreign exchange,
arising from continued heavy reliance on major imported
inputs and the heavy debt service burden.
The,;e outstanding problems- the poor prospects of nonoil exports coupled with the uncertainty of oil export receipts,
the increasing protectionism in the industrial countries which
does not favour significant growth in the exports of manufactured goods and the heavy debt service burden would.s~.
that the 9verall r<>le of external trade in the develop~Jlt of
the Nigerian economy should be critically review~. 'the
internal strength of the economy should be built up throbgh ,
agricultural and industrial transformation which, with the big
potential of the Nigerian economy should result in its less
dependence on external trade and short-run crisis manage-•
ment of limited foreign exchange resources. The achievement
of this ultimate goal will depend on full commitment to the
implementation of the perspective plan which has been
proposed.
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VALUE OF NIGERIA'S Mt\JOR EXPORTS
(:P+' Million)
1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

19891

TOTAL MAJOR AGRIC.
COMMODITIES
OTHER COMMODffiES
CRUDE PETROLEUM

340.5
212.8
13,633.4

178.4
93.2
10,680.5

92.0
98.5
8,601.6

259.0
42.3
7,201.2

208.0
39.4
8,840.6

192.1
305.0
11,223.7

407.4
143.4
8,368.4

1.' .5
Jv.J.5
28,208.6

1,794.2
963.2
28,435.4

1,739.1
1,215.3
55,016.8

GRAND TOTAL

14,186.7

10,952.1

8,792.1

7,502.5

9,088.0

11,720.8

&,919.2

30,360.6

31,192.8

57,971.2

2.4
1.5
96.1

1.6
0.9
97.5

1.0
1.2
97.8

3.4
0.6
96.0

2.3
0.4
97.3

1.6
2.6
95.8

4.6
1.6
93.8

5.2
1.8
93.0

5.7
3.1
91.2

3.0
2.1
94.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

% OF TOTAL EXPORTS
(a) Agric. Commodities
(b) Other Commodities
(c) Crude Petroleum

TOTAL
1

Estimates

SOURCE: Federal Office of Statistics
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TA.ISLE 2

IMPORTS BY MAJOR CROUPS
(N' Million)
I

1982

1983

1984

1985

5,736.3
1,576.2
4,160.1
4,018.0
:,, 152.4
12.9

4,480.5
861.6
3,618.9
3,532.7
2,703.4
53.9

3,700.8
858.8
2,842.0
2,886.?
2.107.··
8.9

2,656.7
632.5
., n-1-2.0
_' _'.()7.2
2,133.3
81.1

2,069.3
247.2
1,822.1
2,486.0
2,493.1
14.2

1,757.8
302.9
1,454.9
2,422.9
1,751.9
6.0

4,304.7
839.5
3,465.2
7,568.0
5,983.7
5.3

6,154.9
214.5
5,940.4
6,862.6
8,406.8
21.4

8,424.8
1,234.4
7,190.4
13,794.5
.8,600.7
9.3

12,919.6

[0,7 /;I.)

8,9(B.7

7,178.3

7,062.6.

5,938.6

17,861.7

21,445.7

30,860.2

Consumer Goods
Durahle
Non- Durable
Capital Goods
Raw Materials
Miscellaneous
TOTAL

1989 1 •

1981

1988

1986~987

1

Provisional

SOURCE: federal Office of Statistics. Lagus
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FOREl(;N EXCHAN(;E FLOWS THROUGH THE ECONOMY
( N' Million)

INFLOW
Oil
Non-oil
OUTFLOW
(a) Visible
(b) Invisible
(i) Deht Service
(ii) Others
(C) Autonomous
NET FLOW

1981

1982

1983

1984

1'18)

1986

1987

1988

11)89 1

12,972.8
10,567.0
2,405.8'
15,993.6
13,379.4
2,614.2
518.5
2,095.7
N.A
-3,020.8

L0,064.1
8,197.7
1,866.4

8,-l-49.7
7.374.1
1,075.6
8.751.0
5.h0 1.2
.3,149.8
1,335.2
1.814.6
NA
-301.3

9,263.6
8.418.9
844.7
8.908.6
5,204.8
1,703.8
2,640.5
1,063.3
N.A
+355.0

11,024.1
10.180.9
843.2
10,463.0
:'i,032.5
5.430.5
3,717.8
1.712.7
N.A.
+561.l

12,496.1
8,293.0
4,203.1
9,752.7
5,667.1
4,085.6
2,502.2
1,583.4
N.A.
+2,743.4

26,374.8
18,637.2
7,737.6
21,251.3
11,930.0
9,321.3
3,820.4
5,500.9

29,133.4
22,162.0
6,97i.4
28,376.1
13,9L0.9
l4,-l-65.2
8,816.8
5,648.4

58,146.8
43,551.')
14.594.9
47.500.4
19.21.:'.I

*

*

+ 1,123.5

+757.3

11,462.4

9,588.9
1,873.5
775.2
1,098.3
N.A.
-1,578.3

N.A = Not Available
1
Provisional
* Added to indi\,idual items of disbursement
SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Returns of Foreign ( )perations Department

28~28~.3

14,997.8
13.290.5

.,

+-1..0,64h.4

TABLE4

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUMM1'RY STATEMENT
(N' Million)

Current Account
Merchandise
Export (F.O.B)
Import (F.O.B)
Services & Income (Net)
Unrequited Transfers (Net)
Long-Term Capital (Net)
Direct Investment (Net)
Portfolio Investment
Other Long Term Capital (Net)
Basic Balance
Other Capital (Short-Term) Net
Balance on Current & Capital
Accounts
Balancing Item
Overall Balance
Reserve Movement

-

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

-3,998.4
- 703.5
11,023.3
-11,726.8
-2,948.4
-346.5
833.1
334.7

-3,105.7
133.8
9,223.9
-9,090.1
-2,950.1
-289.4
1,026.8
290.0

-820.0
1,508.8
7,751.8
-6,243.0
-2,043.0
-285.8
1,373.8
264.3

498.4
-3,165.3
170.0

736.8
-2,078.9
204.6

1109.5
553.8
-1, 102.8

1,504.2
3,839.9
9,138.9
-5,299.0
-2,081.9
-253.8
268.7
144-.5
207.3
-83.1
1,772.9
-1,391.4

2,215.4
5,065.1
11,720.8
-6,655.7
-2,617.7
-232.0
-435.1
434.l
783.0
-1652.2
1.780.3
- 1,336.9

-2,999.1
3,443.9
8,920.5
-5,476.6
-6,202.6
- 240.4
-3,191.0
735.8
151.6
- 4078.4-6,190.1
6,206.7

- 295.3
13,968.1
30,360.6
- 16,392.5
-14,167.2
-96.2
-7,473.6
2,452.8
4353.1
-14279.5
- 7,7()8.9
9,15-U

-1,437.7
11,435.0
31,192.8
-19,757.8
-12,818.6
-54.1
-11,427.7
1,718.2
2,611.8
-15757.7
-12,865.4
11,481.3

13,968.4
29,729.9
57,971.2
-28,241.3
-16,440.l
-6 78. l
-2,272.0
13,983.3
- 1,618.8
-14636.5
11,696.4
-3,796.6

-2,995.3
-25.5
-3,020.8
+3,020.8

-1,874.3
476.0
-1,398.3
+ 1,393.3

- 549.0
247.7
-301.3
+301.3

381.5
-26.7
+354.8
-354.8

443.4
-94.3
+349.l
-349.1

16.6
-800.9
- 784.3
+784.3

1,385.4
-1,226.2
159.2
-159.2

-1384. l
- 910.0
-2294.l
+2,294.l

7,899.8
+828.0
8,727.8
-8,727.8

SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts ( 1981-1988)
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TABLES

TOTAL EXTERNAL ASSETS HOLDINGS 1980 - 1989
(N-' Million)
HOLDER

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

5,4-85.9
5,469.1
16.8

2,441.6
2,424.8
16.8

1,043.3
1,026.5
16.8

742.0
725.2
16.8

1,096.8
1,080.0
16.8

1,657.9
1,641.1
16.8

3,604.2
3,587.4
16.8

4,660.1
4,643.3
16.8

3,289.5
3,272.7
16.8

13,473.9
13,457.1
16.8

B. SEMI-OFFICIAL
INS11TUTIONS WITH
STATE GOVERNMENTS

7.3

6.6

6.6

5.7

5.8

5.7

5.7

5.7

4.7

4.7

C. COMMERCIAL BANKS
(NET)

161.8

128.2

15.4

81.0

319.5

!53.2

1412.7

3302.6

6977..'i

9838.8

5,655.0

2,576.4

1,065.3

828.7

1,422.1

1,816.8

5,022.6

7,968.4

10,271.7

23,317.4

A OFFICIAL (i + ii)

(i) Central Bank*
(ii) Fed. Government

TOTM,
*EXCLUDES ATTACHED ASSETS
SOURCE: A'> for Table 4

TABLE6

FOREIGN EXCHANGE BUDGET, EXPENDITURE AND EARNINGS
1980 - 1989
(N' Million)
1980

A FOREIGN EXCHANGE
BUDGET

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

·1986

1987

1988

1989

7,986.0

12,500.0

9,600.0

7,200.0

8,000.0

8,500.0

9,582.0

19,896.0

33,318.0

49,192.2

B. ACTUAL EXPENDITURE
OUTFLOW

11,804.8

15,993.6

11,993.6

8,751.0

8,408.8

10,463.0

5,238.9

21,251.3

28,376.1

47,500.4

C. FOREIGN EXCHANGE
EARNINGS

14,207.2

12,972.8

10,042.9

8,449.7

9,263.6

11,024.1

10,238.9

26,374.8

29,133.4

58,146.8

...
N

SOURCE: CBN ANNUAL REPORT (VARIOUS EDITIONS)

TABLE7
NAIRA EXCHANGE RATE (END OF PERIOD)

(Naira per US Dollar)

'™l

December 1986
December 1987

3.3166
4.1413

4.6928

4.6000

January 1988
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
Derember

4.1740
4.2611
4.3152
4.2525
4.1838
4.0574
4.3941
4.6440
4.6%1
4.7148
5.1479
5.3530

4.3611
4.2850
4.3470
5.8900
6.4943
6.6660
6.3328
6.8800
5.8115
6.0362
6.4761
8.2856

4.8560
4.5000
4.3000
4.3000
5.4000

January 1989
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

7.0389
7.3828
7.5871
7.5808
7.5051
7.3477
7.1388
7.3000
7.3725
7.4750
7.5454
7.6500

BUREAU
DE
CHANGE

5.9000
6.3500
6.6000
7.2000
7.3250
7.5000
8.3500
8.8500
10.5000
11.6200
11.4300
11.3800
11.5500
10.5500
10.2000
10.6000
10.3500
IJ.2000
96()00

SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria
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10.2000
10.7000
10.4000
9.1000
9.5000

I
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